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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Society Hill Towers Owners' Association and seven named 
individuals1 (collectively the"Residents") appeal from the 
district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
City of Philadelphia and former Mayor, Edward G. Rendell 
(collectively "the City"); and the United States Department 
of Housing and Urban Development and its Secretary, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Individual appellants are Robert D. Greenbaum, Zoe Coulson, John Q. 
Lawson, Jeremy Siegel, Penelope H. Batcheler, Gray Smith, and Roxanne 
Galeota. 
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Andrew M. Cuomo (collectively "HUD"). The Residents 
brought this suit under the Administrative Procedures Act 
("APA"), 5 U.S.C. SS701 et seq., the National Historic 
Preservation Act ("NHPA"), 16 U.S.C. S 470f, and the 
National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. 
S 4321. The Residents claimed that the City had not 
properly performed the environmental and historic reviews 
required under NEPA and NHPA prior to HUD's approval of 
an Urban Development Action Grant ("UDAG"), and that the 
City had not provided meaningful public hearings as 
required under 24 C.F.R. S 570.463(a) prior to submitting 
its fifth amendment to its previously submitted application 
under the UDAG program. For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm. 
 
I. Background 
 
This dispute arose out of HUD's approval of a 
$10,000,000 grant application that the City had previously 
submitted to HUD to partially fund construction of a hotel 
and parking garage in the Penn's Landing area of 
Philadelphia. The factual background of this protracted 
dispute is detailed in the district court's comprehensive 
opinion. See Society Hill Towers Owners' Assn. v. Rendell, 
20 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Therefore, we will only 
briefly summarize the factual and procedural history of this 
dispute insofar as it is helpful to our discussion. 
 
In 1986, the City filed an application with HUD for a 
$10,000,000 UDAG grant to partially fund a portion of a 
festival park that the City intended to build at Penn's 
Landing. The UDAG Program was created by a 1977 
amendment to Title I of the Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974 ("HCDA"). 42 U. S. C.S 5301 et 
seq. "The purpose of the UDAG Program is to`stimulate 
economic development activity needed to aid in economic 
recovery of cities and urban areas which are experiencing 
severe economic distress,' by allowing such cities and 
counties to apply to HUD and compete for grants intended 
to stimulate private economic development." 20 F. Supp.2d 
at 863 (citing 42 U. S. C. S 5318). The application received 
preliminary approval from HUD, and HUD and the City 
executed a grant agreement later that same year. 
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Thereafter, the City submitted four amendments to the 
original application -- each of which was approved by HUD 
-- and the grant agreement was amended each time to 
correspond to the changes made by each amendment. 
However, the festival park was never constructed and the 
federal funds that would have been awarded under the 
UDAG program for that project were never dispersed. 
 
In September 1994, the City submitted a fifth 
amendment to the 1986 UDAG application. That 
amendment abandoned the concept of a festival park, and 
proposed that the grant proceeds be used "solely for the 
construction of a 350-room hotel and 500-vehicle garage. 
This request for a fifth amendment constituted a`whole 
new project' separate and distinct from the festival park 
proposed in the original plan and in the previous approved 
amendments." Id. at 859. HUD eventually approved the 
requested fifth amendment in November, 1994. However, as 
a condition of that approval, HUD required the City to hold 
public hearings as required under the applicable 
regulations. Accordingly, the City published a notice of 
public hearings and, on November 21, 1994, two such 
hearings were held. Only thirteen people attended those 
hearings. Thereafter, the City notified HUD that the City 
had complied with the mandate for public hearings. 
However, a group of local residents who lived in the area of 
the proposed hotel-parking garage (some of whom are 
plaintiffs in this case) learned of the project after the 
November hearings were held, and they began contacting 
the City and HUD to register their opposition to the 
proposed project.2 
 
On August 6, 1996, and August 15, 1996, after 
publishing notice of hearings, the City held additional 
hearings on the hotel-garage project. Unlike thefirst 
hearings, the August hearings were well attended, and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The residents eventually filed suit in district court to stop HUD from 
entering into a new agreement for dispersal of funds under the fifth 
amendment, but that suit was subsequently dismissed without prejudice 
because HUD had not approved the City's request. Accordingly, there 
was no final agency action, and therefore the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
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neighbors who attended expressed intense opposition to the 
project. However, despite the intense and vociferous 
opposition that was expressed at those hearings, the City 
published a Finding Of No Significant Impact ("FONSI") and 
a Notice of Intent/Request for Release of Funds 
("NOI/RROF ") under the fifth amendment to its UDAG 
application. "On October 23, 1996, HUD informed the City 
that the requested fifth amendment was still defective, and 
`suggested' . . . that the request . . . be withdrawn and not 
resubmitted until the City complied with all regulatory 
requirements." Id. at 860. Thereafter, following publication 
of a second FONSI and NOI/RROF, additional public 
comments, and additional environmental certifications, the 
City did withdraw its request for a fifth amendment. 
However, 
 
       [o]n that same day, the City submitted a revised 
       request for a fifth amendment. The revised request 
       described physically the same project as was described 
       in the request for a fifth amendment, i.e. a 350-room 
       hotel and 500-vehicle parking garage. While the project 
       was substantively the same, the developer and 
       financing arrangements were different. Together with 
       the revised request for a fifth amendment, the City also 
       submitted to HUD the environmental review record 
       ("ERR"). 
 
Id. (internal citations omitted). HUD approved the City's 
revised request even though it was virtually identical to the 
request that HUD had asked the City to withdraw. 
Thereafter, on July 24, 1997, the Residents filed the instant 
suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Residents 
contended that the City had not afforded a meaningful 
opportunity for public comment on the project, and that the 
City had not properly conducted the necessary 
environmental and historic reviews. The Residents sought 
to enjoin UDAG funding until the City prepared an 
environmental impact statement ("EIS") to address the 
alleged deficiencies in the City's amended grant application. 
The Residents also sought to have the district court declare 
that the City had failed to conduct meaningful public 
hearings and had failed to properly assess the 
environmental impact of the project, including the impact 
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upon the affected historical district of the city. The 
Residents also sought to enjoin HUD and the City from 
executing the UDAG agreement until "all environmental and 
historical reviews mandated by the applicable statutes and 
regulations have been properly conducted." Id . at 858. 
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed, and the 
district court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants and against the Residents. This appeal followed. 
 
II. The Regulatory Scheme 
 
NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an 
environmental impact statement or EIS for major federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
environment. However, Congress authorized HUD to 
delegate its responsibilities for environmental review, and 
decisionmaking, for UDAG applications to the UDAG  
applicant.3 42 U.S.C. S 5304(g)(1). HUD has promulgated 
regulations that establish environmental review procedures 
for entities assuming HUD environmental review 
responsibilities. 24 C.F.R. 58. 
 
HUD requires preparation of an EIS when a project is 
determined to have a potentially significant impact on the 
human environment. 24 C.F.R. S 58.37. The impact of a 
project upon the environment is first assessed by 
preparation of an Environmental Assessment ("EA"). 24 
C.F.R. S 58.36. If the EA demonstrates that the project will 
not pose a significant environmental impact, HUD requires 
that a FONSI be published for public comment. 24 C.F.R. 
S 58.43. If considerable interest or controversy exists 
concerning a project, HUD requires that the public have 30 
days to comment before the grant recipient can request 
release of funding. 24 C. F. R. S 58.46. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In addition to assuming responsibility for environmental review under 
NEPA, HUD requires the grant recipient to comply with requirements 
that would apply to HUD relating to historic properties, floodplain 
management and wetland protection, coastal zone management, sole 
source aquifers, endangered species, air quality, farmlands protection, 
HUD environmental standards, and environmental justice. 24 C.F.R. 
S 58.5. 
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While NEPA does not specifically address the EA process, 
the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") promulgated 
regulations for implementing NEPA that address this 
process and establish requirements for public participation. 
40 C.F.R. S 1501.4. CEQ does not expressly require 
agencies to involve the public during preparation of an EA. 
40 C.F.R. S 1508.9. CEQ does, however, require agencies to 
"hold or sponsor hearings or public meetings whenever 
appropriate or in accordance with statutory requirements 
applicable to the agency." 40 C.F.R. S 1506.6(c). In 
determining when a public hearing is appropriate, CEQ 
directs agencies to consider whether substantial 
environmental controversy exists concerning the proposed 
action or whether substantial interest exists in holding a 
hearing. 40 C.F.R. 1506.6(c)(1). 
 
While public hearings may or may not be required during 
an EA, agencies are required to make findings of no 
significant impact available to the affected public. 40 C.F.R. 
S 1501.4(e)(1). CEQ only requires that an agency make its 
FONSI available for public review, however, when the 
proposed action is closely similar to one that normally 
requires an EIS or when the nature of the proposed action 
is one without precedent. 40 C.F.R. S 1501(4)(e)(2). 
 
HUD promulgated regulations that establish procedures 
for implementing NEPA and the CEQ regulations. 24 C.F.R. 
Part 58. HUD's procedures do not require a grant recipient 
to conduct public hearings during preparation of an EA. 24 
C.F.R. S 58.40. HUD only requires a grant recipient to 
consider holding a public hearing when an EIS is required.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. HUD identifies factors that the grant recipients should consider in 
determining whether to hold public hearings during an EIS. 24 C.F.R. 
S 58.59(a). These factors include (1) the magnitude of the project in 
terms of economic costs, the geographic area involved, and the 
uniqueness or size of commitment of resources involved; (2) the degree 
of interest in or controversy concerning the project; (3) the complexity 
of 
the issues and the likelihood that information will be presented at the 
hearing which will be of assistance to the responsible entity; and (4) the 
extent to which public involvement has been achieved through other 
means. Id. The Residents point to these factors to support their 
contention that the City was required to hold public hearings before 
making its decision to issue a FONSI. Appellants' Br. at 25. These 
factors, however, only apply to the determination of whether to hold 
public hearings during an EIS. 
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24 C.F.R. S 58.59. HUD does require, however, that FONSIs 
be made available for public review for 30 days when 
"[t]here is a considerable interest or controversy concerning 
the project." 24 C.F.R. S 58.46(a). 
 
Although HUD does not require a grant recipient to 
conduct public hearings during the EA process, an 
opportunity for public participation is required as part of 
the general grant application process under the UDAG  
program.5 24 C.F.R. S 570.454(a). Specifically, HUD 
requires a grant applicant to hold public hearings prior to 
submission of a full application to obtain views of citizens, 
particularly neighbors who reside in the vicinity of the 
proposed project. Id. When submitting a full application for 
HUD to review, a UDAG applicant must include, among 
other things: 
 
       The status of environmental review of the proposed 
       project, the steps taken to notify other involved federal 
       agencies if joint funding is requested, and a proposed 
       timetable for the completion of any required 
       environmental actions as described in 24 C.F.R. part 
       58; and 
 
       A certification providing assurance that prior to 
       submission of its application, it has met the citizen 
       participation requirements of S 570.454(a) and has 
       made the impact analysis required by S 570.454(b). 
 
24 C.F.R. S 570.458(c)(4) & (c)(14)(i). When, as here, an 
applicant submits a significant amendment to a project 
that has previously been approved, HUD may approve the 
amendment if the amendment complies with all the 
regulatory requirements of the UDAG program. 24 C.F.R. 
S 570.463(b)(2). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In 1996, HUD repealed the provisions of 24 C.F.R. pt. 570, subpt. G, 
relating to the application and approval of new UDAGs, characterizing 
these regulations as "obsolete" because no funds had been appropriated 
for new UDAGs for a number of years. The City and HUD agreed to use 
the repealed requirements as a familiar guide to ensure compliance with 
the statutory requirements imposed by the UDAG program. City's Brief 
at 10 n.4. 
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III. Standing 
 
In the district court, the City challenged the Residents' 
standing in a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(1). The district court assumed that the Residents' had 
standing, without deciding the question, and entered 
summary judgment against the Residents on the merits of 
their claims. However, the Supreme Court has recently 
cautioned against the practice of assuming jurisdiction and 
reaching the merits of a dispute merely because a court 
concludes that the suit can be dismissed on the merits 
assuming arguendo that jurisdiction exists. In Steel 
Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 
93 (1998), the Court noted that several Courts of Appeals 
"find it proper to proceed immediately to the merits 
question, despite jurisdictional objections, at least where (1) 
the merits question is more readily resolved, and (2) the 
prevailing party on the merits would be the same as the 
prevailing party were jurisdiction denied." The Court 
referred to this practice as creating "hypothetical 
jurisdiction" and stated: 
 
       Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a 
       hypothetical judgment--which comes to the same thing 
       as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from 
       the beginning . . . Much more than legal niceties are at 
       stake here. The statutory and (especially) constitutional 
       elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of 
       separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the 
       courts from acting at certain times, and even 
       restraining them from acting permanently regarding 
       certain subjects . . . For a court to pronounce upon the 
       meaning or the constitutionality of a state or federal 
       law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very 
       definition, for a court to act ultra vires. 
 
Id. at 101 (citations omitted). The Court cautioned that 
appellate courts must avoid addressing the merits of a 
claim based upon an assumption that it has subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
 
       On every writ of error or appeal, the first and 
       fundamental question is that of jurisdiction, first, of 
       this court, and then of the court from which the record 
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       comes. This question the court is bound to ask and 
       answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested, 
       and without respect to the relation of the parties to it. 
 
Id. at 94 (quoting Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. 
Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)). Accordingly, we begin our 
inquiry with a discussion of whether the Residents have 
standing to challenge the UDAG grant that has been 
awarded pursuant to the City's fifth amendment to the 
City's 1986 UDAG application. 
 
We have recently summarized the requirements for 
Article III constitutional standing as follows: 
 
       (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-- 
       an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) 
       concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, 
       not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a 
       causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
       complained of--the injury has to be fairly traceable to 
       the challenged action of the defendant and not the 
       result of the independent action of some third party 
       not before the court; and (3) it must be likely, as 
       opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
       redressed by a favorable decision. 
 
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc., 
140 F.3d 478, 484-485 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992)). 
 
Here, the basis of the Residents' purported standing was 
well developed in the district court even though the court 
did not address the issue. We also asked the parties to 
address the issue of standing during oral argument on this 
appeal. Based upon the uncontested facts in this record, 
and the various submissions made before us, it is clear 
that Residents live in the Society Hill area, and enjoy the 
amenities of the historic district adjacent to, and included 
within, Penn's Landing and the Delaware River waterfront. 
The Residents' claims all arise from their assertion that the 
project for which UDAG funding is sought under the City's 
fifth amendment will increase traffic, pollution, and noise in 
the Society Hill area where they live. The Residents also 
argue that the project will have a detrimental effect on the 
ambiance of their historic neighborhood, that it will impair 
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their use and enjoyment of Penn's Landing, and that it will 
decrease their property values. They also claim that the 
project's impact is sufficiently significant to require the City 
to prepare an EIS, and that the City has improperly refused 
to take certain measures to mitigate the project's purported 
harm, or to adopt an alternative development as is allegedly 
required by the protections afforded under NEPA and 
NHPA. 
 
The City argues that the Residents have not identified 
injuries to cognizable legal interests, and that they have 
failed to provide any facts to support their allegation that 
the proposed project will increase traffic, pollution and 
noise, impair their use and enjoyment of the historic 
district or waterfront, or decrease their property values. The 
City also contends that even if the Residents can satisfy the 
injury requirement for standing, the alleged injuries could 
not be redressed by a favorable ruling in this suit. 
 
However, the City's argument against the Residents' 
standing conflates issues of standing and questions of 
proof. We think that it is clear that the Residents are 
alleging injury to a legally protected interest--that of 
maintaining the environmental and historic quality of their 
neighborhood. Indeed, the regulatory scheme of NEPA, 
HCDA and the procedural requirements for awarding UDAG 
grants are intended to protect those persons who would be 
most directly affected by a project that is to be funded from 
UDAG funds. If the Residents do not have standing to 
protect the historic and environmental quality of their 
neighborhood, it is hard to imagine that anyone would have 
standing to oppose this UDAG grant. If that is the case, the 
requirement for public hearings, and public input would be 
little more than a meaningless procedural calisthenic that 
would provide little or no protection to those most directly 
affected by the governmental action -- the people who live 
in the vicinity of a federally funded project, and whose lives 
are most directly impacted by the expenditure of UDAG 
funds. 
 
The Residents have alleged concrete and particularized 
injury in the form of increased traffic, pollution, and noise 
that will detrimentally impact the ambiance of their historic 
neighborhood and their ability to use and enjoy the Penn's 
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Landing waterfront. They assert that the impact of the 
proposed project on their neighborhood will decrease their 
property values. There is no assertion that these claims are 
disingenuous or that the Residents claim these injuries 
merely to manufacture a jurisdictional case or controversy 
that would not otherwise exist. Moreover, the interest of the 
Residents is anything but manufactured. It is as real as it 
is fervent, and it is sufficient to give the Residents standing 
to challenge the requested UDAG grant.6  The City counters 
the Residents' claims in part, by reminding us that the 
City's obligation is to all of the residents of Philadelphia, 
and not just to those people who live near Penn's landing. 
The City quite properly notes that it is 
 
       charged with making decisions that benefit the city as 
       a whole; both the architect who surveys Penn's 
       Landing from his [or her] 15th story window at Society 
       Hill Towers and the Port Richmond steelworker who 
       could support his [or her] family for a year working on 
       the Project. After five years, one mayoral election [now 
       two] and the ceaseless drumbeat of Plaintiffs' 
       opposition, the City Defendants still believe that the 
       Project is in the best interests of all of the residents of 
       the city. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Indeed, the City's own brief substantiates the Residents' fervor, and 
the depth of their interest in the outcome of the City's UDAG application. 
The City notes: 
 
        The Plaintiffs oppose the Project and have commenced three 
       separate lawsuits to stop it. They have prosecutedfive appeals to 
       keep two of those lawsuits alive. They have protested, collected 
       signatures and written letters. They have testified at public 
       hearings. . . ." 
 
City's Br. at 4. Of course, the intensity of a party's opposition can not, 
by itself, create a case or controversy in the absence of a significant 
interest in the outcome that is sufficient to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction under Article III. However, the intensity of the Residents' 
opposition here is relevant to an evaluation of whether they have a 
sufficient interest in the outcome to have standing. We think it obvious 
that their interest in the City's UDAG application is genuine, and the 
nexus between the challenged conduct and their asserted injuries is 
sufficiently immediate to establish standing. 
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City's Br. at 4. We recognize the sincerity of the City's 
assertion of its obligation to all of the city's residents. 
However, that duty does not lessen or alter the particular 
interest that the Residents have in this UDAG application. 
In a very real sense, it is their neighborhood that is being 
impacted by this federal expenditure, and not that of the 
illustrative, hypothetical steelworker in Port Richmond. 
Though the latter has an interest in the project, the interest 
of the Residents is qualitatively different, and far more 
immediate and focused. They are not raising "a generally 
available grievance about government--claiming only harm 
to [their] and every citizen's interest in proper application of 
the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more 
directly and tangibly benefits [them] than it does the public 
at large." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573- 
574 (1992). It is not mere hyperbole to proclaim that this 
project "hits them where they live." Thus, the Residents 
have demonstrated an interest in the City's fifth 
amendment to its UDAG application that more than 
satisfies the first prong of Article III standing. 
 
The Residents also meet the causation and redressibility 
prongs of Article III standing. The injury alleged by the 
Residents would directly result from construction of the 
proposed project. Moreover, the alleged injury may well be 
redressed if the City is required to more fully evaluate the 
environmental and historic impacts of the proposed project, 
and take appropriate action to mitigate any identified 
detrimental impacts of the project. 
 
The concept of standing implicates prudential 
considerations that overlap, but extend beyond our inquiry 
under Article III. We have summarized those prudential 
principles as follows: 
 
       (1) the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal 
       rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief 
       on the legal rights or interests of third parties; (2) even 
       when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury 
       sufficient to meet the requirements of Article III, the 
       federal courts will not adjudicate abstract questions of 
       wide public significance which amount to generalized 
       grievances pervasively shared and most appropriately 
       addressed in the respective branches; and (3) the 
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       plaintiff 's complaint must fall within the zone of 
       interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or 
       constitutional guarantee in questions. 
 
Trump Hotels, 140 F.3d at 485 (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). As noted above, the Residents are 
asserting their own legal interests; they are not raising an 
abstract question of wide public significance, and their 
interest is within the zone of interests protected by NEPA 
and NHPA. We, therefore, find that the Society Hill 
Residents have standing to bring this suit. 
 
IV. Standard of Review 
 
The Residents contend that the district court erred in 
granting summary judgment for the City and HUD on the 
Residents' APA, NEPA and NHPA claims. Our review of the 
district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 
F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998). In their claim under the APA, 
the Residents contend that the City's environmental review 
of the UDAG project and HUD's approval of the City'sfifth 
amendment to its UDAG application are arbitrary and 
capricious and fail to comply with NEPA. The Residents 
also allege that the City failed to provide for meaningful 
public participation in the UDAG application review 
process, failed to consider the cumulative impacts of 
proposed development in the Penn's Landing area, failed to 
consider appropriate alternatives, and failed to properly 
weigh the public controversy surrounding the project in 
deciding whether an environmental impact statement was 
required. 
 
The Supreme Court has summarized the standard of 
review we must apply in an appeal under the APA as 
follows: 
 
       [T]he generally applicable standards of S 706 require 
       the reviewing court to engage in a substantial inquiry. 
       Certainly, the [agency's] decision is entitled to a 
       presumption of regularity. But that presumption is not 
       to shield [the agency's] action from a thorough, 
       probing, in-depth review. The court is first required to 
       decide whether the [agency] acted within the scope of 
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       [its] authority . . . Scrutiny of the facts does not end, 
       however, with the determination that the [agency] acted 
       within the scope of [its] statutory authority. Section 
       706(2)(A) requires a finding that the actual choice 
       made was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
       discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. To 
       make this finding the court must consider whether the 
       decision was based on a consideration of the relevant 
       factors and whether there has been a clear error of 
       judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be 
       searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review 
       is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to 
       substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Thefinal 
       inquiry is whether the [agency's] action followed the 
       necessary procedural requirements. 
 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 
415-417 (1971) (citations omitted). 
 
The dispute here centers in large part upon the City's 
conclusion that it need not prepare an EIS, based upon its 
Finding of No Significant Impact at the conclusion of its 
Environmental Assessment. Although it is clear that we 
review HUD's approval of the UDAG application to 
determine if it is arbitrary and capricious, it is not as clear 
that the same standard applies to our review of the City's 
decision to forego preparation of an EIS based upon its 
FONSI. However, in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989), the Supreme Court reviewed 
an agency decision to forego preparation of a supplemental 
EIS under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Here, the 
district court relied upon Marsh in applying that standard 
of review to its scrutiny of the City's decision to not prepare 
an EIS. Other Courts of Appeals that have addressed this 
issue have interpreted Marsh as applying the arbitrary and 
capricious standard to a review of an administrative 
decision to not prepare an EIS based upon a FONSI. See 
Lockhart v. Kenops, 927 F.2d 1028, 1032 (8th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 863 (1991), and Sabine River Authority v. 
U.S. Dept. of Interior, 951 F.2d 669, 677-78 (10th Cir.). We 
believe the district court was correct in adopting that 
standard of review, and it is the standard we will apply 
here. 
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A. Compliance with Public Participation 
       Requirements. 
 
The Residents raise both procedural and substantive 
issues with the manner in which the City conducted public 
hearings on the proposed project. Procedurally, the 
Residents contend that HUD regulations required the City 
to hold public hearings before the City submitted its 
amended grant application and before the City decided 
whether the project had a significant environmental impact. 
Appellants' Brief at 20. The Residents further contend that, 
even though the City purported to hold public hearings, 
those hearings did not comply with the substantive public 
participation requirements because the City had already 
decided to proceed with the project and never gave any 
consideration to the opposition that was voiced during the 
public hearings. 
 
Applicants for UDAG grants are required to hold public 
hearings prior to applying for a grant in order to obtain the 
general views of citizens and neighboring residents, 
particularly those of low and moderate income. 24 C.F.R. 
570.454(a) & (b). HUD also requires grant applicants to 
allow the public to review an applicant's FONSI. 24 C.F.R. 
S 58.46. Here, the City held public hearings on the 
proposed project and provided an opportunity for the public 
to review its FONSI at the conclusion of the City's EA. 
However, the Residents contend that these "hearings" were 
little more than a charade. They argue that the City did not 
provide for meaningful public participation because the 
hearings were held after the UDAG application had been 
submitted to HUD.7 In support of their claim that the City 
never had any intention of considering public comments, 
the Residents assert that the Executive Director of the City 
Planning Commission stated that the project was a"done 
deal" before public hearings were held. Similarly, the 
Residents point to testimony that the Vice President of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. As noted above, this application was actually the fifth amendment to 
a UDAG application first approved by HUD in 1986 to partially fund a 
festival park at Penn's Landing. Because this amendment proposed a 
completely new project, the City was required to comply with all the 
requirements of the UDAG program. 24 U.S.C. 570.463(b)(2). 
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Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation ("PIDC") 
confirmed that the project was a "done deal as far as local 
politics are concerned" prior to any hearings on the UDAG 
application. Appellants' Br. at 24. Thus, according to the 
Residents, the City's act of withdrawing its priorflawed 
application and resubmitting a virtually identical one as its 
"fifth amendment" could not cure the regulatory and 
statutory defects in the City's UDAG application. 
 
Although the statutory and regulatory scheme pertaining 
to UDAG grants require public hearings prior to submission 
of an application, nothing in the regulations prevent an 
applicant from curing a procedural defect in a UDAG 
application by withdrawing the defective application, curing 
the defect, and then resubmitting the application. That is 
what occurred here. The initial application and earlier 
amendments were submitted without proper public 
notification and hearings. The prior amendment was 
withdrawn, hearings were held, and the application was 
then resubmitted. Under the circumstances, we understand 
why the Residents might feel that their opposition fell upon 
deaf ears even though they were finally able to voice it. 
However, the record here is to the contrary. It shows that 
the City did not totally ignore the concerns of neighborhood 
residents, though those concerns were clearly not 
addressed to the extent, or in the manner, that the 
Residents would have liked. Accordingly, as we discuss 
more thoroughly below, we can not conclude that the 
decision to forego an EIS was "arbitrary or capricious" or 
"without observance of procedure required by law" under 
the APA. 5 U.S.C. S 706(2). 
 
B. The Cumulative Impact of the Project 
       on the Neighborhood. 
 
As noted above, CEQ regulations provide the framework 
for how cumulative impacts are to be addressed in an EA. 
When an EA concludes with a FONSI, an agency is required 
to briefly present why an action will not have a significant 
impact on the human environment. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.13. 
CEQ identifies factors that should be considered in 
determining whether an impact is significant. 40 C.F.R. 
S 1508.27. Although the impact of a particular project may 
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be inconsequential when considered in isolation, if the 
cumulative impact of a given project and other planned 
projects is significant, an applicant can not simply prepare 
an EA for its project, issue a FONSI, and ignore the overall 
impact of the project on a particular neighborhood. 40 
C.F.R. S 1508.27(b)(7). Thus, CEQ directs agencies to 
consider: 
 
       Whether the action is related to other actions with 
       individually insignificant but cumulatively significant 
       impacts. Significance exists if it is reasonable to 
       anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the 
       environment. Significance cannot be avoided by 
       terming an action temporary or by breaking it down 
       into small component parts. 
 
Id. CEQ defines "cumulative impact" as "the impact on the 
environment which results from the incremental impact of 
the action when added to other past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what 
agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such 
other actions." 40 C.F.R. S 1508.7. Cumulative impacts can 
result from individually minor but collectively significant 
actions taking place over a period of time. Id . HUD directs 
entities conducting environmental reviews to "group 
together and evaluate as a single project all individual 
activities which are related either on a geographical or 
functional basis, or are logical parts of composite of 
contemplated actions." 24 C.F.R. S 58.32(a). 
 
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) the 
Supreme Court addressed the question of when the 
cumulative impact of other projects must be included in an 
environmental analysis. The Court stated "when several 
proposals for [ ] actions that will have cumulative or 
synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending 
concurrently before an agency, their environmental 
consequences must be considered together." Id . at 410. The 
Court noted however, that the concept of "cumulative 
impact" was not intended to expand an inquiry into the 
realm of the fanciful. 
 
       The statute, however, speaks solely in terms of 
       proposed actions; it does not require an agency to 
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       consider the possible environmental impacts of less 
       imminent actions when preparing the impact statement 
       on proposed actions. Should contemplated action later 
       reach the stage of actual proposals, impact statements 
       on them will take into account the effect of their 
       approval upon the existing environment; and the 
       condition of that environment presumably will reflect 
       earlier proposed actions and their effects. 
 
Id. at 410 n.20. In National Wildlife Federation v. FERC, 912 
F.2d 1471, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit amplified the holding in Kleppe as follows: 
 
       Kleppe thus clearly establishes that an EIS need not 
       delve into the possible effects of a hypothetical project, 
       but need only focus on the impact of the particular 
       proposal at issue and other pending or recently 
       approved proposals that might be connected to or act 
       cumulatively with the proposal at issue. 
 
In Sierra Club v. Froehike, 534 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir. 
1976), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
summarized the then existing case law pertaining to 
"segmentation" -- another term for expressing the 
cumulative impact of a project. The court stated: 
 
       Where it is found that the project before the court is an 
       essentially independent one, an EIS for that project 
       alone has been found sufficient compliance with the 
       act. In such a case there is not irretrievable 
       commitment of resources beyond what is actually 
       expended in an individual project. 
 
Similarly, in Webb v. Gorsuch, 699 F.2d 157, 161(4th Cir. 
1983), the court concluded: 
 
       Generally, an administrative agency need consider the 
       impact of other proposed projects when developing an 
       EIS for a pending project only if the projects are so 
       interdependent that it would be unwise or irrational to 
       complete one without the others. 
 
That standard was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit in Park County Resource Council v. USDA, 
817 F.2d 609, 623 (10th Cir. 1987), overruled on other 
grounds, Village of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque v. Marsh, 
 
                                19 
  
956 F.2d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1992), and Airport Neighbors 
Alliance v. U.S., 90 F.3d 426, 433 (10th Cir. 1996). In 
Airport Neighbors Alliance, the court found that the 
remaining components of the airport's master plan were not 
"so interdependent that it would be unwise or irrational to 
complete the Runway 321 upgrade without them." Id. 
Accordingly, the court held that the FAA had not 
"inappropriately ignored cumulative impacts when it failed 
to analyze extensively the remaining components of the 
Master Plan in the EA." The court reasoned that,"requiring 
a cumulative EIS analyzing possible future actions 
postulated in a twenty-year Master Plan that are far from 
certain would result in a `gross misallocation of resources, 
would trivialize NEPA and would diminish its utility in 
providing useful environmental analysis for major federal 
actions that truly affect the environment.' " Id. at 431 
(quoting Park County, 817 F.2d at 623). 
 
Similarly, under circumstances analogous to those 
presented here, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the City of New Orleans appropriately 
limited its environmental review under the UDAG program 
to a proposed hotel, retail and parking development. Vieux 
Carre Property Owners v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 
1983). The court concluded that other phases in the City's 
Master Plan for the area affected by the UDAG grant project 
(Phases III through V) were "indefinite and speculative in 
nature; [as] no final plans nor private funding commitments 
exist as to Phases III through V, and no further design work 
or land acquisition as to Phases IV and V has been 
performed since 1978." Id. at 1275. Although we realize 
that some courts have adopted a more expansive approach 
to requiring a UDAG applicant to determine cumulative 
impact, we agree with the holding in Webb that such a 
determination must be governed by considerations of 
whether other projects are so "interdependent that it would 
be unwise or irrational to complete one without the others."8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. See LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1988). There, the court 
concluded that the applicant's finding of no potential for adverse 
cumulative impact on the environment could not be sustained because 
the applicant "[had] not considered the impact that all past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future projects may have on the basin's 
resources, . . .." Id. at 402. 
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Webb, at 161. However, we believe that a court must also 
consider the likelihood that a given project will be 
constructed along with the interdependence of other 
projects. The more certain it is that a given project will be 
completed, the more reasonable it is to require a UDAG 
applicant to consider the cumulative impact of that project 
and the applicant's project in determining the applicant's 
obligations under the applicable regulations. 
 
The Residents contend that the City's EA was deficient 
because the City did not consider the impact of future 
development that had been identified in several planning 
documents9 including a proposed"mega" entertainment 
complex planned at Penn's Landing. However, projects that 
the City has merely proposed in planning documents are 
not sufficiently concrete to warrant inclusion in the EA for 
the hotel/parking garage project at issue here. The district 
court correctly focused upon the likelihood that the other 
projects will be completed as well as the interdependence of 
the hotel/parking-garage and those other projects. In doing 
so it stated: 
 
       First, the Court notes that the evidence does not 
       suggest that the City could not sever any connection 
       between the hotel and other projects without 
       destroying the proposed action's functionality. Second, 
       plaintiffs do not point to any evidence in the 
       administrative record that realization of the future 
       plans was, indeed, expected to materialize. NEPA only 
       requires consideration of the cumulative impact of 
       proposed, and not merely contemplated future actions. 
       Where future development is unlikely or difficult to 
       anticipate there is no need to study cumulative 
       impacts. Thus, the Court concludes that based on the 
       record, the City was not required to conduct a 
       cumulative impact analysis as part of the EA. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Residents point to six plans referenced by the City in its 
environmental assessment: the Comprehensive Land Use Plan; the Plan 
for Center City; the Penn's Landing Master Plan; the Penn's Landing 
Development Plan; the Central Riverfront District Plan; and the River 
Walk Plan. 
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20 F. Supp. 2d at 870 (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). Although an EA may need to include a cumulative 
impact analysis even if it is practical to sever any 
connection between a project and other projects if it is 
sufficiently certain that such other projects will be 
constructed, we nevertheless agree with the district court's 
analysis here.10 It is not at all certain that the proposed 
"mega" entertainment complex or any of the projects 
included in the planning documents will ever be completed. 
 
Moreover, even if the Residents could establish that these 
projects were going to be completed, that finding would not 
undermine the City's FONSI because the district court 
concluded that those projects and the hotel/parking garage 
are not sufficiently interdependent. The success of a hotel 
and parking garage in the Penn's Landing is not tied to 
construction of an entertainment complex. Moreover, plans 
for the Penn's Landing area appear to change regularly. 
Given the circumstances here, the City should not be 
required to evaluate and reevaluate the environmental 
impacts of such projects as part of the EA for this UDAG 
application with every change in the plans for development 
of Penn's Landing no matter how tenuous the contemplated 
project may be. 
 
C. Alternatives to the Project. 
 
NEPA requires all Federal agencies to "[s]tudy, develop, 
and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended 
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved 
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources." 
42 U.S.C. 4331(2)(E). The CEQ regulations require that EAs 
include a brief discussion of the need for the proposal, of 
alternatives as required by section 102(2)(E) of NEPA, and 
of the environmental impacts of the proposed actions and 
alternatives. HUD regulations require an EA to "[e]xamine 
and recommend feasible ways in which the project or 
external factors relating to the project could be modified in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. "[W]e do not propose to attempt the impossible, namely, the 
enunciation of a general rule that will cover all cases. The crucial 
dependence is upon the facts before the court in the particular case sub 
judice." Sierra Club v. Froehike, 534 F.2d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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order to eliminate or minimize adverse environmental 
impacts" and "[e]xamine alternatives to the project itself, if 
appropriate, including the alternative of no action." 24 
C.F.R. S 58.40(d) & (e). 
 
The Residents contend that the City's finding of no 
significant impact is arbitrary and capricious because the 
City improperly rejected an alternative location for the 
project. Appellants' Br. at 41. The Residents urged the City 
to consider locating the proposed hotel just south of the 
foot of Market Street. Id. The Residents contend that 
location is better suited for a hotel because it is a larger site 
which will allow a structure with a larger footprint and a 
lower overall profile, while providing the same total capacity 
without leading traffic directly into the narrow streets of 
Society Hill via Dock Street. Id. The Residents state, and 
the City does not dispute, that the City rejected the 
alternative location because the Development Plan adopted 
by the City Planning Commission prohibits the construction 
of structures at the ends of various streets to protect east- 
west views from Center City to the river, the location would 
have a closer proximity to resources listed on the National 
Register of Historic Places, and the alternative location 
would have required alteration or relocation of several 
interceptor sewers at significant cost. Id. The Residents 
contend that these reasons are not legitimate, however, 
because the City has planned since 1963 to build a 50- 
story office tower at the alternative location. Id. 
 
NEPA only requires that appropriate alternatives be 
considered. 42 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(E). NEPA does not mandate 
that any particular alternative be selected during an EA. 
See Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 869 F.2d 719, 730 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989)(NEPA 
imposes procedural requirements, not substantive 
outcomes). The City did consider the alternative proposed 
by the Residents and the City provided reasons for not 
selecting that alternative location. While the City did not 
select the location preferred by the Residents, the City 
notes that new traffic analyses were conducted and 
included in the record in response to concerns raised 
during the public comment period. The Residents would 
have us view the City's reasons for not selecting the 
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alternate location as arbitrary and capricious because the 
City allegedly has had plans for over 25 years to build a 
larger structure at this same location near the foot of 
Market Street. The Residents have not shown, however, 
that the City actually intends to build that structure. 
 
D. The Controversial Nature of the UDAG Application. 
 
Under a heading entitled: "The Public Outcry Demands 
Preparation of an EIS," the Residents argue,"[e]xistence of 
a public controversy relating to a project is a factor that an 
agency should consider in assessing whether to prepare an 
EIS." Appellants' Br. at 43. The CEQ identifies ten factors 
that should be considered in determining if a project's 
impact is so significant that an EIS is required, and one of 
these factors is the degree to which the effects on the 
quality of the human environment are likely to be highly 
controversial. 40 C.F.R. S 1508.27(b)(4). However, in Hanly 
v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), the court 
states: 
 
        [T]he term `controversial' apparently refers to cases 
       where a substantial dispute exists as to the size, 
       nature or effect of the major federal action rather than 
       to the existence of opposition to a use, the effect of 
       which is relatively undisputed . . . The suggestion that 
       `controversial' must be equated with neighborhood 
       opposition has also been rejected by others. 
 
Here, the Residents have not raised a substantial dispute 
regarding the environmental effects identified by the City in 
its EA for this project. Rather, the controversy here centers 
on the Residents' opposition to the City's choice of location 
for the project. Moreover, even if the issues that the 
Residents raise could be deemed to raise a "controversy" 
under the regulations, it is important to note that the 
existence of a controversy is only one of the ten factors 
listed for determining if an EIS is necessary. Given the 
nature of the "controversy" involved and the fact that 
degree of controversy is only one of ten factors to be 
considered in determining whether a significant impact is 
present, we can not conclude that the City's decision to 
issue a FONSI was arbitrary and capricious. 
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V. Approval Under NHPA 
 
Finally, the Society Hill Residents contend that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
City and HUD on the Residents' claim under NHPA. 
 
Regulations implementing NHPA are set forth in 36 
C.F.R. S 800 et seq. The regulations include specific 
requirements for implementing NHPA under the UDAG 
program.  36 C.F.R. S 801. The UDAG regulations provide 
that the UDAG applicant, rather than HUD, must comply 
with the regulations. 36 C.F.R. S 801.2(b). A UDAG 
applicant is required to identify National Register 
properties, and properties that may meet the criteria for 
listing on the National Register, that may be affected by the 
project. 36 C.F.R. S 801.3(b). The applicant is also required 
to determine the effect of the project on these properties 
pursuant to criteria set forth in the regulations. 36 C.F.R. 
S 801.3(c). 
 
If an applicant determines that the project will have no 
effect on any identified historic properties, the project 
requires no further review by the Advisory Council on 
Historic Preservation (hereinafter "Council") "unless a timely 
objection is made by the Executive Director." 36 C.F.R. 
S 801.3(c)(2)(i) (emphasis added). An applicant is required to 
seek comments from the Council to satisfy the applicant's 
responsibilities under section 106 of NHPA. 36 C.F.R. 
S 801.4. The regulations require the following: 
 
       Upon receipt of a Determination of No Adverse Effect 
       from an applicant, the Executive Director will review 
       the Determination and supporting documentation 
       required by S 801.7(a). Failure to provide the required 
       information at the time the applicant requests Council 
       comments will delay the process. The Executive 
       Director will respond to the applicant within 15 days 
       after receipt of the information required in S 801.7(a). 
       Unless the Executive Director objects to the 
       Determination within 15 days after receipt, the 
       applicant will be considered to have satisfied its 
       responsibilities under section 106 of the Act and these 
       regulations and no further Council review is required. 
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36 C.F.R. S 801.4(b)(1). The documentation required to 
support a Determination of No Adverse Effects includes: 
 
       (i) A general discussion and chronology of the pro posed 
       project; 
 
       (ii) A description of the proposed project includi ng, as 
       appropriate, photographs, maps, drawings and 
       specifications; 
 
       (iii) A copy of the National Register form or a co py of 
       the Determination of Eligibility documentation for each 
       property that will be affected by the project including a 
       description of each property's physical appearance and 
       significance; 
 
       (iv) A brief explaining why each of the Criteria o f 
       Adverse Effect (See statement S 801.3(c)(1)) was found 
       inapplicable; 
 
       (v) Written views of the State Historic Preservati on 
       Officer concerning the Determination of No Adverse 
       Effect, if available; and, 
 
       (vi) An estimate of the cost of the project includ ing the 
       amount of the UDAG grant and a description of any 
       other Federal involvement. 
 
36 C.F.R. S 801.7(b)(1). 
 
During oral argument we expressed our concern that the 
record did not reflect that the City had afforded the 
Advisory Council for Historic Preservation an opportunity to 
respond to the City's finding that the UDAG project would 
have no adverse affect on the nearby historic district and 
we asked the parties to submit documentation to support 
their respective contentions on this issue. See  16 U.S.C. 
S 470f. The City responded in a letter in which it asserted 
that review by the Advisory Council was not required under 
36 C.F.R. pt. 801 ("Part 801") because HUD had delegated 
the responsibility for assessing the project's impact on the 
historic district to the City, and the City had determined 
that there was no impact. 
 
In response, the Residents agreed with the City's 
assertion that the applicant's determination of no effect 
eliminates the necessity for further review by the Council 
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"unless a timely objection is made by the Executive 
Director," 36 C.F.R. S 801.3(c)(2)(I). However, the Residents 
argued that: the City's determination of no impact was 
never submitted to the Executive Director; the City never 
made a determination of no effect on any National Register 
property under NHPA (as distinct from any review under 
NEPA); and the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum 
Commission failed to make its views known as is required 
under 36 C.F.R. S 801.3(b)(5), as the Commission "merely 
accepted the findings of the City's Historical Preservation 
Officer;" and that the Philadelphia Historical Preservation 
Officer "was demonstrably wrong when he found that a 
visual barrier protected Society Hill and Old City from the 
visual impact of the hotel tower and garage wall." However, 
in their brief on appeal, the Residents' only asserted the 
following challenge to the City's failure to seek approval of 
the Advisory Council: 
 
        The District Court concluded that the City met its 
       delegated responsibility under the NHPA which made 
       review by the Advisory Council unnecessary. 
 
        The record, however, shows that the findings on 
       historical impact were based upon the City Historical 
       Preservation Officer's belief that "construction along 
       Front Street obstructs the view of the proposed hotel 
       from the historic district," and that the result of this 
       "visual barrier" is that "the proposed hotel development 
       on Penn's Landing will have no effect on the Society 
       Hill National Historic District." 
 
        This conclusion is clearly erroneous. . . . 
 
Appellants' Br. at 47. Accordingly, the allegations of error 
asserted by the Residents in their letter, other than the 
assertion that the findings on historical impact were clearly 
erroneous, have been waived and we will not now address 
them.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We note that NHPA appears to require that the appropriate agency or 
the applicant (where, as here, the agency delegates compliance to the 
applicant) obtain the review of the Advisory Council. NHPA states that 
the appropriate agency: 
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Although the Residents clearly disagree with findings 
pertaining to the line of sight of the proposed project, and 
the project's impact on the historical district, those findings 
are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
district court did not err in holding that no further 
authorization from the Advisory Council was required. 
 
       VI. 
 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we will 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the 
City and HUD on the Residents' APA, NEPA and NHPA 
claims. 
 
A True Copy: 
       Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       shall, prior to the expenditure of any federal funds on [an] 
       undertaking . . . take into account the effect of the undertaking 
on 
       any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included 
in or 
       eligible for inclusion in the National Register. The head of any 
such 
       Federal agency shall afford the Advisory Council on Historic 
       Preservation . . . a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard 
       to such undertaking. 
 
16 U.S.C. S 470f (emphasis added). Accordingly, the procedure 
authorized under 36 C.F.R. S 801.3(c)(2)((i) appears to be inconsistent 
with the statute. However, as noted above, the Residents did not raise 
this issue in their opening brief and we will not now address it. See 
Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 
(3d Cir. 1994)("An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening 
brief. . . ."). 
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